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Abstract
Counterfactual explanations are gaining prominence within technical, legal, and business
circles as a way to explain the decisions of a machine learning model. These explanations
share a trait with the long-established “principal reason” explanations required by U.S. credit
laws: they both explain a decision by highlighting a set of features deemed most relevant—and
withholding others.
These “feature-highlighting explanations” have several desirable properties: They place no
constraints on model complexity, do not require model disclosure, detail what needed to be
different to achieve a different decision, and seem to automate compliance with the law. But
they are far more complex and subjective than they appear.
In this paper, we demonstrate that the utility of feature-highlighting explanations relies on
a number of easily overlooked assumptions: that the recommended change in feature values
clearly maps to real-world actions, that features can be made commensurate by looking only
at the distribution of the training data, that features are only relevant to the decision at hand,
and that the underlying model is stable over time, monotonic, and limited to binary outcomes.
We then explore several consequences of acknowledging and attempting to address these as-
sumptions, including a paradox in the way that feature-highlighting explanations aim to respect
autonomy, the unchecked power that feature-highlighting explanations grant decision makers,
and a tension between making these explanations useful and the need to keep the model hidden.
While new research suggests several ways that feature-highlighting explanations can work
around some of the problems that we identify, the disconnect between features in the model and
actions in the real world—and the subjective choices necessary to compensate for this—must
be understood before these techniques can be usefully implemented.
1 Introduction
Explanations are increasingly seen as a way to restore the agency that algorithmic decision making
takes from its subjects. Advocates believe that explanations can enhance the autonomy of people
subject to automated decisions, allow people to navigate the rules that govern their lives, help
people recognize when they should contest decisions or object to the decision making process, and
facilitate direct oversight and regulation of algorithms [47, 37].
In this paper, we examine two related approaches to explanation: the counterfactual explana-
tions that have been explored in recent computer science research and which are gaining traction
in industry, and the “principal reason” approach drawn from U.S. credit laws. We will call these
two approaches “feature-highlighting explanations.” At a high level, these approaches provide the
subject of a decision with a set of factors that “explain” the decision. Though they are distinct
∗Microsoft Research and Cornell University
†University of California Los Angeles
‡Cornell University
1
ar
X
iv
:1
91
2.
04
93
0v
1 
 [c
s.C
Y]
  1
0 D
ec
 20
19
in operation and motivation, both methods highlight a certain subset of features that are deemed
most deserving of the decision subject’s attention.
There are at least five reasons for the growing popularity of feature-highlighting explana-
tions. First, this approach appears to allow practitioners to abandon any constraints on model
complexity—a constraint often seen as a barrier to improved model performance. Second, it al-
lows businesses to avoid disclosing models in their entirety, thereby protecting trade secrets and
businesses’ other proprietary interests, while limiting decision subjects’ ability to game the model.
Third, the approach promises a concrete justification for a decision or precise instructions for
achieving a different outcome. Fourth, it allows firms to automate the difficult task of generating
explanations for a model’s decisions. And finally, it appears to generate explanations that comply
with legal requirements both in the United States and Europe.
Generating feature-highlighting explanations is far from straightforward, however, and requires
decision makers to make many consequential and subjective choices along the way. In this paper,
we demonstrate that the promised utility of feature-highlighting explanations rests on four key
assumptions, easily overlooked, and rarely justified: (1) that a change in feature value clearly maps
to an action in the real world; (2) that features can be made commensurate by looking only at
the distribution of feature values in the training data; (3) that explanations can be offered without
regard to decision making in other areas of people’s lives; and (4) that the underlying model is
stable over time, monotonic, and limited to binary outcomes.
The paper then explores three tensions at the heart of feature-highlighting explanations. First,
while feature-highlighting explanations are designed to respect or enhance the autonomy of decision
subjects, the decision maker is put in the position of having to make determinations about what
is best for the decision subject; this is paternalism in the name of autonomy. Furthermore, the
only way for a decision maker to be sensitive to decision subjects’ needs and preferences is to
further intrude into their lives, gathering enough information to respect their autonomy, while
compromising the autonomy afforded by privacy in the process. Second, partial disclosure puts the
decision subject at the mercy of the decision maker. The choice of what to disclose grants a great
deal of power to the decision maker. By granting such power to businesses, we invite them to use
that power for interests other than those of the decision subject. At best, this leads to beneficent
paternalism, at worst, self-dealing. Finally, attempts to overcome some of these challenges by
providing decision subjects a larger number and more diverse set of explanations or affording them
the opportunity to explore the consequences of specific changes will eventually risk revealing the
model altogether. If these techniques fail to protect their intellectual property, firms are unlikely
to adopt them.
2 What are feature-highlighting explanations?
We define a feature-highlighting explanation as an explanation that seeks to educate the decision
subject by pointing to specific features in the model that matter to the individual decision, where
each type of feature-highlighting explanation may define “matter” differently. The two types we
discuss here are counterfactual and “principal reason” explanations. Counterfactual explanations
in particular have begun to attract the interest of businesses, regulators, and legal scholars, with
many converging on the belief that such explanations are the preferred approach to explaining
machine learning models and their decisions. Principal-reason explanations are well established
in U.S. credit laws, with various businesses having well developed procedures for generating and
issuing so-called “adverse action notices” (AANs). Both methods aim to produce explanations of
a particular decision by highlighting factors deemed useful or important. There could be other
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types of feature-highlighting explanations, in principle, but these two are the most developed. This
section will describe both approaches, and how they relate to each other.
2.1 Counterfactual explanations
Recent proposals from computer scientists have focused on generating counterfactual explanations
for the decisions of a machine learning model [27, 47, 44, 29, 20, 17, 15, 34, 25, 9]. The goal of
counterfactual explanations is to provide actionable guidance—to explain how things could have
been different and provide a concrete set of steps a consumer might take to achieve a different
outcome in the future. Counterfactual explanations are generated by identifying the features that,
if minimally changed, would alter the output of the model.
In particular, an emerging theme in the computer science literature is to frame the search for
such features as an optimization problem, seeking to find the “nearest” hypothetical point that
is classified differently from the point currently in question [47, 29, 36, 20, 44]. In casting the
search for counterfactual explanations as an optimization problem, a key challenge is to define a
notion of distance. Different features are rarely directly comparable because they are represented
on numerical scales that do not meaningfully map onto one another. We discuss this challenge
more in Section 3.2.
Wachter et al. have also argued that counterfactual explanations could satisfy the explanation
requirements of the E.U.’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [47]. Over the last several
years, lawyers and legal scholars have debated whether certain provisions of the GDPR create a
right to an explanation of algorithmic decisions, and, if it exists, whether and when it requires an
explanation of specific decisions or the model [19, 39, 4, 46, 10, 5, 28, 26]. The official interpretation
of the Article 29 Working Party—a government body charged with creating official interpretations of
European data protection law—has concluded that the GDPR requires, at a minimum, explanations
of specific decisions [1]. Thus, part of the rationale to employ counterfactual explanations is to
satisfy the legal requirements of the GDPR.
2.2 Principal reason explanations
The other type of feature-highlighting explanation is what we call a “principal reason” explana-
tion. The principal-reason approach has a long history in the United States, where the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) [13], Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) [11], and Regulation B [32] re-
quire creditors—and others using credit information—to provide consumers with reasons explaining
their adverse decisions (e.g., consumers being given a subprime interest rate, denied credit outright,
or denied a job based on credit, etc.) [37]. Under ECOA and Regulation B, these decision makers
are required to issue AANs to such consumers; under FCRA, consumers are given a list of “key
factors.” These notices must include a statement of no more than four “specific reasons” for the
adverse decision [13, 32].1 A Sample Form in the Appendix to the regulation offers a non-exhaustive
list of acceptable reasons, such as “income insufficient for amount of credit requested,” “unable to
verify income,” “length of employment,” “poor credit performance with us,” “bankruptcy,” and
“no credit file” [32, Appx. C, (Sample Form)]. Under the regulation, “no factor that was a princi-
pal reason for adverse action may be excluded from disclosure, [and t]he creditor must disclose the
actual reasons for denial” [32, § 1002.9(b)(2), emphasis added].
What counts as a principal reason is not well-defined in either the statutes or regulation. The
legislative history of ECOA indicates that consumer education is a primary goal:
1The number four is not a hard limit under Regulation B, as it is under FCRA, but it is observed in practice.
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[R]ejected credit applicants will now be able to learn where and how their credit status is
deficient and this information should have a pervasive and valuable educational benefit.
Instead of being told only that they do not meet a particular creditor’s standards,
consumers particularly should benefit from knowing, for example, that the reason for
the denial is their short residence in the area, or their recent change of employment, or
their already over-extended financial situation [40, p. 4]
This would seem to suggest that counterfactual explanations, as currently conceived, would serve
the intended purpose of AANs. And indeed, some scholars have suggested as much [44]. But this
very ambiguity also demonstrates that principal reasons are satisfied by a broader array of possible
feature-highlighting explanations. For example, the Official Staff Interpretation to Regulation B,
originally published in 1985 [14], suggests two ways creditors can generate principal reasons:
One method is to identify the factors for which the applicant’s score fell furthest below
the average score for each of those factors achieved by applicants whose total score was
at or slightly above the minimum passing score. Another method is to identify the
factors for which the applicant’s score fell furthest below the average score for each of
those factors achieved by all applicants [32, Supplement I].
Note that neither approach uses the decision boundary as the relevant point of comparison.
Instead, they compare the value of applicants’ features to the average value of these features for
the credit-receiving or general population, in an attempt to surface the dimensions along which the
applicant is most deficient.2
Principal-reason explanations lack the precision of counterfactual explanations because they
come from the law, not computer science. Legal concepts are rarely defined in mathematically
rigorous ways, in no small degree because the ambiguity is meant to be subject to later legal
interpretation [38]. While we might hope to formally operationalize the concept of principal reasons
with these suggested methods, doing so risks imposing a misleading degree of specificity where there
is ambiguity.
2.3 Highlighting subsets of features in the service of autonomy
For our purposes, counterfactual and principal-reason explanations have one crucial thing in com-
mon: neither involves disclosing the model in its entirety. They focus, instead, on highlighting a
limited set of features that are most deserving of a decision subject’s attention. By design, they do
not provide an exhaustive inventory of all the features that a model considers. In practice, learned
models can often consider a very large set of features, and an explanation that suggests changes to
each of those features would be overwhelming. As a result, both the law (in the form of principal
reasons) and the emerging technical literature (in the form of counterfactual explanations) seek to
produce “sparse” explanations that present the decision subject with only a small subset of features
[47].
When opting to use feature-highlighting explanations, there is no natural way to choose between
principal-reasons and counterfactual explanations. Yet rarely is the choice to use one method over
another discussed explicitly, or, indeed, even recognized as a choice in the first place. These methods
produce different explanations and serve fundamentally different goals.
2Though they are written into the regulation, it is not clear that firms actually use these methods to generate
principal reasons.
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Focusing on features that are furthest from the average value of the features in the credit-
receiving or general population casts the problem of identifying principal reasons as one of iden-
tifying extreme deficiencies that would seem to rule out the applicant completely, rather than
near-misses that applicants might readily address before applying for credit again in the future.
While the former may strike us as a less attractive or sensible approach to explanation, there may
be good reason to favor an explanation that makes clear the features that were held against an
applicant. With the latter approach, while the applicant might receive helpful advice, she might
not learn that other features were viewed by the model as crucial marks against her.
Principal-reason explanations treat importance in terms of procedural justice: to respect the
autonomy of a decision subject, the decision subject deserves to know which factors dominated the
decision [43]. In counterfactual explanations, respect for autonomy means that decision subjects
need to know how choices affect outcomes, and thus how they can take actions that will most
effectively serve their interests in the future. The former operates more like a justification for
a decision—a rationale, with little immediate concern for recourse—whereas the latter serves a
more practical purpose—providing explicit guidance for achieving a different decision in the future.
Crucially, both styles of explanations can be educational, even if they differ in how easily decision
subjects can act on them.
In keeping with these differences, the principal reasons offered by creditors tend to be vaguer
(“Income insufficient for amount of credit requested”), while counterfactual explanations aim for
precision (“Had you earned $5,000 more, your request for credit would have been approved”).
In many cases, principal-reason explanations do not even disclose the magnitude, let alone the
direction, of change that would be necessary to achieve a different outcome, while such details
are inherent to counterfactual explanations. In fact, the official interpretation of the regulation
that requires creditors to issue AANs notes that creditors ”need not describe how or why a factor
adversely affected an applicant. For example, the notice may say “length of residence” rather than
“too short a period of residence” [32, § 1002.9(b)(2) (Official Interpretation)]
3 Feature-highlighting explanations in practice
There are several hidden assumptions behind the belief that feature-highlighting explanations will
be useful for decision subjects. In this section, we identify four such assumptions, explain why they
might not be valid, and explore the consequences of that realization.
3.1 Features do not clearly map to actions
Feature-highlighting explanations often assume a clear and direct translation from suggested changes
in feature values to actions in the real world. In many cases, this is a reasonable assumption: in-
structing someone to reduce their total lines of credit maps onto the obvious action of cancelling a
credit card or fully repaying—and thus dispensing with—a loan. In most of the contexts in which
existing scholarship considers the challenge of explaining the decisions of a machine learning model,
there is a clear correspondence between the feature values that one is told to change and the actions
that one would take to achieve those changes. And yet, in many cases, we are only able to perform
this mapping because we have relevant domain knowledge and an implicit causal model in mind
that relates specific actions in the real world to predictable changes in feature values.
Even when the highlighted feature seems to refer to something rather concrete, the actions a
decision subject can take to affect those features may not line up with the features themselves.
For example, a recommendation that someone increase his income can lead a person to take one of
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Decision result
Decision
boundary
Possible
explanations
(1)
(2)
Length of employment
Income
Figure 1: A decision based on two features—income and length of employment—will be explained
by reference to one of the features, either the shortest or longest distance from the boundary. But
the explanations do not map to the decision subject’s possible actions that can affect them. Point
(1) represents getting a higher-paying job, and point (2) represents waiting for a raise.
several actions: he can seek a new job, ask for a raise, or take on more hours. As Figure 1 illustrates,
these actions are not as simple as “increase income” or “increase length of employment.”
Individuals cannot in general instantaneously change the features suggested by an explanation.
Some features, like length of employment, are inherently time-dependent. Other changes may take
varying degrees of time to implement. Suppose, for instance, the decision subject could obtain
credit either by increasing their income by $5,000 or by increasing the length of their employment
by 6 months. If it would take 6 months of especially grueling work to secure a raise, it would seem
unnecessary for him to do so instead of simply waiting 6 months to qualify. On the other hand,
if the subject needs credit immediately and is able to change to a higher-paying job right away,
then we might view income as the right feature to provide the subject in an explanation. Because
the relationship between features and actions is time-dependent, explanations that do not consider
temporal aspects will fail to highlight the “right” features.
But these examples still assume a relatively direct relationship. To act on explanations that
instruct us to change certain feature values, we need to know what causes features to change value
in the real world. This might not be obvious; we may struggle to identify the actions that would
cause a feature value to change—or change in a predictable way.
Recent work on “actionable” explanations has focused on avoiding explanations that tell people
to make changes that are impossible, placing the burden on decision makers to give advice that
is sensitive to the actual steps that decision subjects would need to take to achieve the change in
feature values [44, 29]. Avoiding these potential explanations is a matter of identifying the lack of
any possible causal mechanism in the real world that would have the necessary effect on the value
of some feature.
“Gaming” is just a special case of this disconnect between feature changes and actions [3].
When a decision maker instructs someone to change certain features, the decision maker will often
assume that the person will take a specific desirable sequence of actions because that is the causal
mechanism that the decision maker has in mind. But there are often many other ways to change
feature values that don’t require taking these steps [22].
Highlighting certain features as those that need to change to obtain a different decision also
implicitly relies on the belief that everything else can be held constant while making these changes.
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In reality, actions may affect multiple features simultaneously. Changes in the value of one feature
may also affect the value of another feature, if the two features interact. As Figure 1 demonstrates,
whether one increases his income by finding a higher-paying job or waiting for his performance
review to get his raise, the action will affect both income and length of employment, a separate
feature in the model. In the case of a job change, length of employment will be negatively affected.
Thus, increasing income may not be enough to get credit, which is why point (1) is on the left of
the decision boundary. In the case of waiting for a raise, a smaller increase in income might be
needed than the explanation would say, because length of employment increases at the same time.
This is why point (2) is on the right side of the decision boundary, despite not increasing income as
much as the explanation suggests. When considered in the context of feasible real-world actions,
it becomes clear that features may not be independent : changing one feature may impact others.
Insisting that explanations exhibit sensitivity to these constraints is analogous to insisting that
explanations consider the causal mechanisms that allow decision subjects to alter the value of
specific features. Indeed, the only way to ensure that the recommended change is even possible,
to prevent gaming, and to account for dependencies between features is to model the outcome of
interest using features that directly figure into the causal mechanism. The idea that we can identify
all such constraints in advance assumes that the actions necessary to change specific feature values
will always be self-evident.
3.2 Features cannot be made commensurate by looking only at the distribution
of the training data
All feature-highlighting explanations rely on some notion of a distance between the observed values
for various features and some reference point, whether the the decision boundary or the average
value in the population. Relying on distance requires normalizing features, because there needs
to be a shared scale between features in order to meaningfully compare them. For example, as
discussed in Section 2.1, an increase in length of employment is not naturally commensurate with
an increase in salary. Normalization attempts to capture the fact that salaries may vary on the
order of thousands or tens of thousands of dollars, but length of employment (in years, say) varies
at a numerically much smaller scale.
Several statistical techniques exist to address this problem, scaling features so as to make them
seemingly comparable, and different explanation techniques use different approaches. Following
Wachter et al., the literature on counterfactual explanations has mostly converged on a heuristic
that finds the Median Absolute Deviation (MAD) under an L1 distance norm [36, 29, 15]. Mean-
while, it is entirely unclear what methods principal-reason explanations use—the regulations do
not specify, and it is never discussed in practice—but the nature of a distance metric requires that
something be used. Normalization techniques are typically based entirely on the distribution of the
data, not some external point of reference.
When examined from the perspective of a decision subject who must take some action in
response to these explanations, normalization based simply on the distribution of data is somewhat
arbitrary. One decision maker might scale the axes such that increasing income by $5,000 annually is
equivalent to an additional year on the job. A competing lender, using different training data, could
conclude that $10,000 of income corresponds to one year of work. These lenders might therefore
produce different explanations depending on the scaling of attributes. Without an external point of
reference to ground these scales, the meaning of the relative difference in feature values is unclear.
Relying on the distribution of the training data to normalize features is an example of what
Selbst et al. have called the “framing trap,” where an attempt to address concerns with accountabil-
ity targets properties of the model alone, ignoring crucial interactions with the outside world [38].
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What counts as seemingly equivalent features according to the distribution of the training data is
not necessarily what the decision subject would view as equivalent. Making features commensurate
in this way fails to consider the particular circumstances faced by any given decision subject.
Because we are concerned with decision subject’s menu of options, the most sensible external
referent would be something akin to the cost of making the required change, where cost can imply
dollars spent, effort, or time. For counterfactual explanations, those features that involve little
cost to change, even if they involve considerable change along a normalized numeric scale, may
be far more useful to highlight than those that would be costlier to change. If, instead, the
preferred approach involves generating principal reasons, features that are costly or impossible to
change may be precisely the ones that should be highlighted. Given its focus on identifying the
features easiest to change, counterfactual explanations might conceal that a decision largely hinged
on immutable characteristics like race. Worse, such explanations might mislead the subjects of
these decisions into believing that their fate was determined by factors under their control. This
is particularly worrying, considering that the fields turn to explanations has in large part been a
response to concerns about discrimination or fairness and the statute that mandates AANs is itself
an anti-discrimination law. Knowing that one’s application for credit has been rejected due to
characteristics outside one’s control might be paramount if the goal is to ensure procedural justice
or to reveal when to contest the decision [28, 47, 4].
Thinking about changes in terms of their real-world cost therefore helps to translate numerical
changes in feature values to real-world actions, whether we want to point out either what is easiest
or most difficult to change. Some recent work seeks to account for the cost of actually manipulating
features in practice by assuming domain knowledge or soliciting user input [44, 15, 29], but decision
subjects may be unable to articulate all of the relevant real-world constraints that would affect the
utility of an explanation.
Worse yet, the cost of making certain changes will not be consistent across different people.
Changes that might be rather inexpensive for one person to make might be costly for another
person to make [35]. Thus, when we use explanations to identify the easiest or most difficult
features for someone to change to achieve a different decision from a model, the explanation must
be sensitive not only to how these changes involve different costs, but how these costs vary across
the population. Different subsets of features may be appropriate for different people with different
life circumstances. This complication cuts against the very desirability of these explanations: the
idea that we can automatically determine what is easiest or hardest to change.
3.3 Features may be relevant to decision making in multiple domains
Feature-highlighting explanations may interact with facts about a person’s life that are invisible to
the model. In particular, the supposition of a counterfactual explanation is that it is offering advice
about the kinds of changes that it would be rational for a person to make to achieve better results in
future decisions. Some commentators and scholars have cautioned that explanations should never
encourage people to take actions that are irrational or harmful [16, 12]. What they mean more
specifically is that there may be some recommendations that are indeed rational if the only goal is
to obtain a positive decision from the model, but irrational with respect to other goals in a person’s
life.
A common-sense example for this proposition is that an explanation should never recommend
that a person seek to make less money [e.g. 23]. While we believe it unrealistic that an actual
credit model would ever (be allowed to) learn such a relationship, the example still holds value. It
is self-evident that no one would want to make less money, even if doing so would improve their
access to credit. Or consider an example that reverses this dependency: a person contemplating
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applying to a new job for its superior health insurance is unlikely to remain at his current job
because an explanation for a failed credit application told him to increase the value of his length-
of-employment feature. In this case, acting on the recommendation would impose an opportunity
cost on the consumer by forcing him to forgo benefits in other domains. When other aspects of
one’s life depend on some of the same features, explanations for how to get the desired outcome in
one aspect of your life may conflict with those in another.
We can reason about this the other way around as well. From the point of view of a counterfac-
tual explanation, an applicant might be best off trying to change a number of other features besides
income. Yet, from the perspective of the applicant, increasing her income might have ancillary ben-
efits in other parts of her life that make this change more attractive—and indeed rational—than
those suggested by the explanation. Increasing her income would grant her improved access not
only to credit, but to improved quality of life, generally.
In the first case, a change in feature might benefit the decision subject in one domain, while
hurting her in others. In the second case, a change in a feature might benefit the decision subject
in multiple domains, not just one. These spillovers—both negative and positive—complicate the
process of determining which features would be most useful to highlight in an explanation. Ideally,
feature-highlighting explanations would allow decision subjects to avoid negative spillovers and
identify opportunities for positive spillover. But a decision maker will lack information about the
many other goals that a person might have in her life and the features that are relevant in those
domains.
This also highlights an additional risk: due to other life goals, decision subjects may change
undisclosed features unless otherwise instructed. For example, if a counterfactual explanation tells
someone to increase her income and lower her debt, but fails to mention that she should not reduce
her length of employment, she may have no idea that she should avoid any career change while
attempting to address these other issues, stumbling accidentally into point (1) in Figure 1. Indeed,
she might not even know that length of employment figured into the credit decision in the first
place. Thus, by failing to disclose what a decision subject must not change, an explanation may
lead her to take an ultimately unsuccessful action.
3.4 Models may not have certain properties: stability, monotonicity, and binary
outcomes
Those advocating in favor of feature-highlighting explanations tend to assume that the underlying
models have certain properties: stability, monotonicity, and binary outcomes.
Credit scoring models are routinely retrained to react to changes in the overall environment
and to changes in borrowers’ behavioral patterns. Perhaps there is another recession. Or perhaps
borrowers change their behavior en masse based on the very explanations that lenders have offered
in the past, shifting the data distribution over time [24]. Any of these changes would necessitate
model retraining by the lender. Wachter et al. have thus argued that the law should treat a
counterfactual explanation as a promise rather than just an explanation [47]. They argue that if
a rejected applicant makes the recommended changes, the promise should be honored and credit
granted, irrespective of the changes to the model that have occurred in the meantime. Whether
this is the right approach or not, it is a recognition that without such a guarantee, counterfactual
explanations might not serve their purpose when one considers the time it takes to make the
suggested changes.
Feature-highlighting explanations can also be misleading if the model has not been subject
to monotonicity constraints, which guarantee that as the value of the features move in the rec-
ommended direction, the decision subject’s chances of success consistently improves. Without
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monotinicity constraints, a model might learn complex and even counter-intuitive relationships be-
tween certain features and an outcome of interest. For example, a model might learn that people
who have spent two to four years at their current job are good candidates for credit, while those
who have stayed five or more are not. Likewise, carrying more debt might render applicants less
attractive, until they start earning more income, at which point additional debt might make them
more attractive.
Decision subjects will not necessarily be able to alter the value of these features through some
sudden step change. Instead, they may have to make incremental changes in the direction of
the specified value. And despite their best efforts, decision subjects might struggle to hit the
specified feature value; their efforts could move the value of these features in the right direction,
but ultimately fail to get the decision subject all the way there. Similarly, decision subjects might
lack precise control over the value of a feature, making it difficult to avoid overshooting the mark
when they take some action. Unless the model exhibits monotonicity with respect to the highlighted
features, the decision subject might find herself in a worse position as she moves toward the specified
value or if she exceeds it.
Similarly, principal-reasons explanations can lose their utility without monotonicity. In some
cases, highlighted features like “length of employment” do not suggest an obvious direction for
improvement, and indeed, models may not be monotone in such features. In such cases, a decision
subject will not know whether an adverse decision was made because the highlighted feature was
too high or too low—simply that it was particularly far from what was expected.
Finally, in the computer science literature, model explanations often assume that outcomes are
binary: did the applicant receive a loan or not? In reality, the creditor decides not only whether or
not a loan is given, but also the loan’s interest rate. How should feature-highlighting explanations
account for this? Does the decision maker choose a specific target interest rate when providing an
explanation? What if the applicant is only interested in a loan below a certain rate?
Consider a financially responsible borrower who will only accept a loan at a sufficiently low
interest rate. If she is told via a counterfactual explanation that she could qualify for a high-
interest loan by increasing her income without reducing her debt, she learns nothing about how
to qualify for a low-interest loan; what it would take to obtain a low-interest loan might be very
different than what it would take to secure one with a high interest rate. There may be no way to
extrapolate a strategy for obtaining a low-interest loan from the counterfactual explanation that
gets her to a high-interest loan. Indeed, she may not even know that the counterfactual explanation
that tells her how to get a loan is specific to a high-interest loan, instead seeing the interest rate
on offer as the only option, and concluding that she cannot get a better rate.
4 Unavoidable Tensions
We have argued so far that the need to disclose a limited subset of features infuses feature-
highlighting explanations with subjective choices and creates a number of challenges that makes
their promise harder to realize in practice than advocates of such techniques would have us believe.
They also present a number of unavoidable normative tensions. Decision makers start with a great
deal of power over decision subjects, and the purpose of explanations—and the legal requirements
for them—is to restore some degree of power to the decision subjects. Yet the fact that decision
makers must, by necessity, withhold information creates three unavoidable tensions. First, in or-
der to generate genuinely helpful explanations, decision makers must be both paternalistic and
privacy-invasive. That is, they must interfere with decision subjects’ autonomy to offer some back
to them. Second, while designed to restore power to decision subjects, partial explanations grant
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a new kind of power to the decision maker, to use for good or to abuse as desired. Finally, the
additional transparency that might help overcome some of the problems with feature-highlighting
explanations render these techniques anathema to the decision makers that we would want to use
them.
4.1 The autonomy paradox
Feature-highlighting explanations are motivated by either the desire to make recommendations
to decision subjects or to justify the model’s decision. Both these motivations originate from a
concern with the autonomy of decision subjects. Recommendations appeal to an instrumental
vision of autonomy, where information enables action. Justification, however, is more focused on
a moral conception; the information is due because the subject deserves to know. Both of these
motivations are complicated by the need to withhold some information.
Ironically, respecting a decision subject’s autonomy will require making assumptions about
which information will be valuable to a given decision subject. The decision maker will not know
how features correspond to actions in the real world, and thus which features a decision subject could
most readily change. The decision maker does not know how a change in the measured feature,
or the action required to make such a change, affects other aspects of a person’s life positively
or negatively. And assuming the decision maker could achieve a general sense of these facts, the
decision maker further does not know how they vary from person to person. All this means that the
choice of features to disclose can have unintended effects for decision subjects, which would have
been avoided with a different disclosure. Given the informational position of the decision maker,
there is simply no way to fully realize its commitment to respecting a decision subject’s autonomy.
One might suggest that these problems can be solved with even more data. If explaining a
credit decision, the decision maker’s choice of which features to highlight might be affected by
information about a person’s health, family situation, or future educational plans. And a decision
subject’s willingness to look for a new job will be influenced by whether they are sick, have a new
baby or aging relative to care for, or are saving to go back to school. This information can directly
or indirectly be mined from other sources in the world, such as social media data. If a decision
maker understands other aspects of a person’s life that may interact with the decision, then it
might be able to offer explanations that are appropriate and tailored, or might be able to focus on
features that are relevant to decisions in multiple contexts. So perhaps the answer is to collect it
all.
Unfortunately, allowing a decision maker, such as a lender, to collect and connect every bit of in-
formation about a person’s life is not really a solution. Rather, it is a privacy disaster [e.g. 41, 7, 30],
and because privacy is a fundamental aspect of autonomy [8, 33], this leads to an autonomy para-
dox. The problem appears most clearly through the lens of Helen Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual
integrity [30]. Contextual integrity argues that a privacy violation occurs where information flows
between actors in social context in ways that violate the informational norms relative to that con-
text. So in one sense, this solution—allowing lenders in financial context to access social media
information—is definitionally problematic. A primary concern of contextual integrity is for social
contexts to keep operating as they should. If creditors have access to social media data, the worry
is that they will make credit determinations based on public friendships, for example, and as a
result people will have incentives to change or hide their social relationships in order to get better
credit [31]. This will harm the social contexts in which friendships flourish for the sake of credit.
Ironically, then, while in Section 3 we argued that explanations would not be useful unless the deci-
sion maker understood facts about people’s lives beyond those considered in the model, contextual
integrity would suggest that the fact of decision makers knowing this information is itself harmful
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to autonomy.
But imagine a decision subject who, facing an adverse credit decision, is shown the complete
model and finds it overwhelming. Such a person may instead prefer the counterfactual explanation,
even if it requires the decision subject to disclose all the information necessary for the decision maker
to offer an appropriately tailored set of instructions. This exact scenario motivates much of the work
on counterfactual explanations, so we should not discount that a more informed explanation can
still be autonomy-enhancing on balance. In a sense, this tension is reflective of a common concern
in discussions of autonomy: When can giving up information and agency be autonomy-enhancing?
For example, if a person hires an attorney, she outsources some important decisions, gives up very
private information, and often gets answers back that she cannot understand. But it is doubtful
that anyone would consider hiring a lawyer to be a loss of autonomy. At the same time, we would
immediately recognize that furnishing lenders with detailed information and relinquishing control
over decision making is not an obvious mechanism for enhancing ones autonomy. Notably, there
are no requirements that they act in your best interest, while such fiduciary obligations do apply
to lawyers. This is a difficult tension to resolve, and may depend on the relative power of and
constraints upon the decision maker, rather than the quality of the explanation.
4.2 The burden and power to choose
One of the reasons feature-highlighting explanations are so appealing is that they appear to offer
complete automation: whenever a decision is made, an explanation can be provided without any
further human intervention. But this veneer of mechanization belies the fact that such explanations
cannot be completely formulaic. They require decisions about what to disclose and assumptions
about the real world.
The need for partial disclosure grants new power to the decision maker. Of course, a decision
maker—by virtue of being one—has always had power over the decision subject. But by attempting
to return power to the decision subject via an explanation that, for her own sake, cannot be a
complete explanation, we grant a new form of largely unanticipated power to the decision maker.
Furthermore, the requirement to make certain assumptions about the real world also grants power
to the decision maker. Whenever there is ambiguity in the individual’s preferences, the decision
maker has the power to resolve the ambiguity however it sees fit. This leaves the decision maker
with significant room to maneuver, the choice of when and where to further investigate, and more
degrees of freedom to make choices that promote their own welfare than we might realize.
This new power can be used for good or ill. Consider, for example, a decision maker providing
a counterfactual explanation for why an individual did not qualify for a loan. As discussed in
Section 3.4, this decision (and therefore explanation) is not simply binary—in its explanation,
the decision maker must give the decision subject a counterfactual that would result in a specific
interest rate. At best, it might allow the subject to choose their target interest rate. Alternatively,
it might—somewhat paternalistically—choose the interest rate that it believes is “right” for this
subject. More insidiously, it might choose the interest rate that is likely to maximize its profit.
Ultimately, the point is that in the absence of standards or robust avenues for user input, the
decision maker is left with the power to make this decision on its own.
This power is not simply limited to the choice of outcome. As we have argued, many aspects
of explanations are unspecified by the law or by technical proposals, including what factors can
be included in an explanation, what the relative costs of various features are, and how to account
for real-world dependencies between them. The key point here is that left to their own devices,
decision makers are afforded a remarkable degree of power to pursue their own welfare through
these choices.
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4.3 Too much transparency
Decision makers might seek out different ways to address the difficulty of taking decision subjects’
real-world circumstances into account when generating feature-highlighting explanations. A number
of recent papers propose presenting the user with a diverse set of counterfactual explanations [29,
36, 47], allowing the decision subject to choose among several possible ways to achieve a favorable
outcome. This approach accepts that decision makers may lack the capacity to ever fully account
for the unique constraints and preferences of decision subjects, instead providing a wide range of
possible paths to success from which the decision subjects can choose. Doing so allows the decision
subject to rely on knowledge of her own particular circumstances in selecting among these.
Others have advocated in favor of interactive tools that allow decision subjects to explore
the effect of making changes to certain features [6, 18]. Industry has even implemented some
such tools.3 This approach gives decision subjects greater freedom to explore the space, using a
deep understanding of their own constraints and preferences to investigate the effect of certain
adjustments.
Still other work adopts an entirely different approach, focusing instead on finding ways for the
decision maker to learn more about decision subjects. In particular, there have been recent propos-
als to devise mechanisms for soliciting input from decision subjects, allowing them to communicate
whether they find certain counterfactuals helpful, whether changes to certain features are out of
the question or less desirable, and what other preferences they might hold [29].
These approaches could also work in concert, seeding decisions subjects with an initial set of
diverse explanations that could serve as starting points for interactive exploration. In theory, this
would have the benefit of helping to ensure that decision subjects do not fail to explore the space
sufficiently, concluding their investigation after only making a small number of adjustments from
one initial starting point.
Unfortunately, each of these approaches runs the risk of revealing a sufficient amount of infor-
mation about the underlying model to reconstruct it [42]. As a result, while these approaches may
be the most promising to overcome certain difficulties, they create difficulties of their own. Firms
concerned with intellectual property and gaming are unlikely to afford decision subjects extensive
freedom to explore.
5 Conclusion
Feature-highlighting explanations have been embraced as a way to help decision makers avoid a
number of difficult trade-offs, granting firms the capacity to provide meaningful and useful explana-
tions of machine-learned models without having to compromise on model performance, while also
respecting concerns with trade secrecy, gaming, and legal compliance. Advocates have championed
this style of explanation as an elegant way to honor and enhance decision subjects’ autonomy even
as machine learning models grow in complexity and ubiquity.
Yet as we have shown, these explanations lack a connection to the real-world actions required
to change features. They fail to consider the cost of these actions, decision subjects’ preferences,
and the effects of the necessary actions on other parts of decision subjects’ lives. Worse, attempts
to correct these deficiencies undermine the very goals of explanation by violating decision subjects
autonomy in the name of enhancing it and granting more power to decision makers when trying to
return it to decision subjects.
3See, e.g., Credit Karma’s Credit Score Simulator: https://www.creditkarma.com/tools/
credit-score-simulator/
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So what can be done? How can feature-highlighting explanations be useful, while protecting
the autonomy of decision subjects? Much more work is needed to address the issues we have raised
here, but we see three concrete avenues worth exploring.
First, at an absolute minimum, given the power that these explanations grant to decision
makers, they should disclose the method by which they generate explanations. Additionally, legal
requirements for explanation and AANs should be amended to require this. Without understanding
the method of explanation, decision subjects have no hope of understanding how to effectively realize
their goals.
Second, to address the autonomy paradox, fiduciary obligations are worth exploring. Fiduciary
obligations are legal requirements that constrain certain people or entities who hold a position of
trust to act in the best interests of their beneficiaries. Common examples or fiduciary-beneficiary
pairs include attorneys and clients, corporate officers and shareholders, and in some cases, financial
advisors and advisees. Over the last several years, legal scholars have debated whether an informa-
tion fiduciaries framework would work well as a scheme to regulate the data economy, generally [e.g.
2, 21]. While these scholars are not primarily writing about feature-highlighting explanations, the
case for fiduciary obligations seems especially good here, as we observe a similar situation to that of
any position of trust: (1) there may be no way to explain the decisions of a machine learning model
sufficiently well that a person can devise a rational course of action for herself and (2) the institu-
tion charged with explaining its decisions might otherwise have their own interests in suggesting a
specific course of action. As a policy matter, a fiduciary obligation on the institution would require
that its explanations are aligned with the subjects best interests, and may help resolve some of
tensions created by the autonomy paradox and power to selectively disclose features.
Third, we need to understand what actions people actually take when confronted with feature-
highlighting explanations—and which disclosures help people act most effectively. Empirical re-
search is essential to answer these questions. One obvious place to start such work is with longitu-
dinal data documenting the successful paths that previous decision subjects have taken to receive
positive outcomes when starting from various circumstances. Another is to engage directly with
decision subjects to develop a richer account of their everyday strategies for responding to models
and explanations of their decisions, as Malte Ziewitz and Ranjit Singh have done over the past few
years.4 This approach rests on the idea that explanations should focus on communicating what
had worked well for other people under seemingly similar conditions.
These proposals will only address some of the issues with feature-highlighting explanations
raised here. In work concurrent with our own, Venkatasubramanian and Alfano raise similar con-
cerns and offer some potential solutions [45]. Going forward, there is still more work to do, in
computer science, social science, and policy, if we want to understand when and where feature-
highlighting explanations can be useful to decision makers and decision subjects alike.
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